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Unemployed Movements in the Global South: 
The cases of Argentina and Tunisia 
Irene Weipert-Fenner and Jonas Wolff1 
ABSTRACT 
Comparative research on unemployed activism, to date, is largely based on countries in the Global 
North although two outstanding cases of mobilization of jobless people can be found in the Global 
South: Argentina, which between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s experienced probably the 
strongest wave of mobilization of unemployed workers on record worldwide, and Tunisia, where 
unemployed have played a significant role in waves of protests since 2008, including during the 
national uprising of 2010/11 that brought down long-standing Dictator Ben Ali. This working 
paper studies the two cases along the factors derived from general social movement theory and 
systematically compares them with the findings on unemployed movements in the Global North. 
The analysis reveals important common features that characterize unemployed movements across 
countries and contexts, but also dynamics that a narrow North-Western focus tends to miss. Most 
importantly, changes in general political opportunity structures and the mobilization of unem-
ployed prove to be strongly interrelated in Argentina and Tunisia. The effects of opening political 
opportunities, however, have had decidedly ambivalent effects on these unemployed movements. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
During the last ten years, a series of comparative studies on mobilization processes among unem-
ployed people has emerged (cf. Baglioni et al. 2008; Chabanet and Faniel 2012; Giugni 2008; La-
husen 2013; Reiss and Perry 2011). Until now, however, this scholarship almost entirely focuses on 
the Global North and, in particular, on Europe. Argentina, the country with the greatest mobiliza-
tion of unemployed that ever existed, has not found systematic integration into these comparative 
studies. The same holds true for the few existing studies on other cases from the Global South such 
as Emperador Badimon’s (2013a, b) work on the unemployed graduates in Morocco and the analy-
sis of the politicization of unemployment in British-ruled Palestine by De Vries and Bar-On 
(2011). Against this background, the present paper sets out to contribute to existing comparative 
research on unemployed movements by systematically bringing in two experiences from the Glob-
al South, namely: the above-mentioned case of Argentina and the more recent, and hitherto under-
studied, case of Tunisia. 
In Argentina, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a severe economic crisis triggered what is, to date, 
the most impressive cycle of contention among unemployed people worldwide (cf. Delamata 2004; 
Dinerstein 2003; Epstein 2006; Garay 2007; Svampa and Pereyra 2004; Wolff 2007). Tunisia repre-
sents those North African countries that, since the early 1990s, have seen the rise of unemployed 
movements, which have mainly been driven by unemployed university graduates (cf. Emperador 
Badimon 2013a, b; Geisser 2000). In both cases, unemployed movements became part of broader 
social uprisings that led to important episodes of political change: the 2011 “revolution” in Tunisia, 
i.e. the fall of long-standing dictator Ben Ali and the subsequent process of democratization, and 
                                                 
 
1  This working paper has been written in the context of the research project “Socioeconomic Protests and Political 
Transformation: Dynamics of Contentious Politics in Egypt and Tunisia against the Background of South American 
Experiences” which is generously funded by the VolkswagenStiftung (see http://bit.ly/29xdLmO). A previous version 
was presented at IPSA’s 24th World Congress of Political Science, 23–28 July 2016, Poznań, Poland. The authors thank 
Didier Chabanet as well as our research team for comments and Giuseppe Campisi, Johanna Faulstich, Fynn Kaese, 
Francy Köllner, and Isabel Ruckelshaus for research assistance. 
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the 2001 “social explosion” in Argentina, i.e. the toppling of elected president De la Rúa and the 
following process of within-regime change.2 
In order to embark on a truly global research agenda on unemployed movements, this paper un-
dertakes a two-step comparison. On the one hand, we compare Argentina and Tunisia as very 
dissimilar cases within the Global South (democratic versus authoritarian/transition context; mo-
bilization of unemployed workers versus mobilization of unemployed graduates; broad range of 
unemployed organizations versus only one). On the other hand, we compare common features of 
these Southern cases with key findings from the existing comparative studies on unemployed 
movements in the Global North. The overall rationale behind this comparative strategy is that (a) 
factors that have been identified by existing research on the Global North and that also character-
ize both our different Southern cases can be assumed to generally characterize the mobilization of 
the unemployed independent of different regional or country contexts; and that (b) features that 
characterize both Argentina and Tunisia but set them apart from what we know about European 
(and U.S.) cases plausibly reflect differences between the Global North and the Global South.3 
Theoretically, our two-step comparison draws on the range of key explanatory factors that have 
been identified by general social movement theory. Hence, our analytical framework considers 
grievances, organizational resources and mobilization networks, collective action frames, as well as 
political opportunities.4 In doing so, we explicitly refrain from taking the research findings on 
Northern unemployed movements as the benchmark against which we, then, assess the Southern 
experiences. Still, we are aware that also social movement research in general has its origin, and 
still a strong imprint, from empirical research on Europe and the U.S. (cf. Beinin and Vairel 2013; 
Rossi and Von Bülow 2015). 
Empirically, we identify the following factors that arguably shape unemployed mobilization world-
wide: Relative increases in grievances trigger mobilization, while pre-existing local networks, avail-
able sociopolitical allies (such as trade unions) as well as the development of collective action 
frames that meet with public resonance are crucial for the development of proper unemployed 
movements. The most notable difference of our cases as compared to existing research concerns 
political opportunity structures. Research on European unemployed movements shows that it is 
not differences in general political opportunity structures that matter but opportunities that are 
specific to the institutional field (welfare state/social security) that is directly relevant for unem-
ployed people (Giugni 2008). Our case studies confirm this relevance of specific opportunities, but 
Argentina and Tunisia also show a high degree of interconnectedness between shifting general 
political opportunities and unemployed mobilization. In both cases, in spite of very different types 
of political change (regime change in Tunisia, within-regime change in Argentina), the opening of 
                                                 
 
2  In addition to Tunisia, further examples of this kind include Morocco (Association nationale des diplômés chômeurs 
du Maroc) and, in West Africa, Senegal (Regroupement des Diplômés Sans Emploi du Senegal). The Algerian unem-
ployed movement (Comité national de defense des droits des chômeurs) likewise includes unemployed graduates but 
also unemployed workers without university degree. 
3  We deliberately use the terms Global South and Global North, although we are fully aware that both as well as the 
distinction between the two are problematic proxies for a much more complex set of differences, asymmetric relation-
ships and (post-colonial) historical legacies that characterize the contemporary world (see, for instance, Hollington et 
al. 2015). For our purposes, the focus on the Global South is justified by three overarching differences between the 
countries of the former Third World and those from the so-called developed world: The latter is generally character-
ized by high state capacities (including in the area of welfare/social security), relatively stable and democratic political 
regimes, high levels of capitalist, socioeconomic development, and a highly institutionalized, formal economy; the for-
mer, in contrast, tend to have lower (and varying) state capacities (including in the area of welfare/social security), 
much more diverse and unstable political regimes, lower levels of capitalist, socioeconomic development and a large in-
formal sector. These differences, quite plausibly, will affect the grievances associated with unemployment as well as the 
opportunities, capacities and strategies to collectively address these grievances. 
4  In line with contemporary versions of the contentious politics approach (McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 2011), we do not 
consider these factors to be competing independent variables but as mutually dependent parts of the causal mecha-
nisms that underlie the complex dynamics of social movements and that, as dynamic, social factors, can themselves be 
transformed, reinterpreted and/or appropriated by the very movements. 
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political opportunities had crucial, but ambivalent, consequences for the unemployed movements: 
The political opening, in both cases, has had mobilizing as well as demobilizing effects. 
In what follows, we will introduce the two cases, describing the emergence and dynamics, the de-
mands and repertoires of contention that characterize the unemployed movements in Argentina 
and Tunisia, respectively. In a second, explanatory step, we will discuss factors that social move-
ment research has identified as crucial in shaping dynamics of contention. The conclusion identi-
fies the overall results of this study and situates them within existing research. In terms of sources 
and methods, the two case studies inevitably differ significantly as in the case of Argentina, we can 
draw on extensive existing research, including studies conducted by one of the authors, in order to 
basically look back at a fairly completed cycle of contention (Wolff 2007). In the case of Tunisia, 
we mostly have to rely on field research carried out by the other author, primary sources and 
newspaper accounts in order to get a grip on what is still very much a moving target.5 In contrast 
to the case of Argentina, where a whole series of different unemployed movement organizations 
emerged, the unemployed movement in Tunisia is easier to grasp as unemployed protests have 
produced only one organization that exists nation-wide and on which we, hence, can and have to 
focus on: the Union des diplômés chômeurs (UDC).  
2. THE UNEMPLOYED MOVEMENT IN ARGENTINA 
In the early 1990s, Argentina saw the implementation of a fairly radical program of monetary sta-
bilization and neoliberal reforms, which initially stopped hyperinflation, but quickly gave way to a 
period of economic stagnation and, in 2001, finally collapsed in an economic breakdown driven by 
mutually reinforcing debt, currency and banking crises.6 While this context of socioeconomic 
deterioration undoubtedly fueled the mobilization of the unemployed in the country (see below), 
the first expressions of what was to become known as the piquetero (picketer) movement emerged 
from quite specific local contexts: marginal urban areas in the provinces of Neuquén (Cutral-
Có/Plaza Huincul) and Salta (General Mosconi/Tartagal). In these oil towns, the privatization of 
the state petroleum company implied not only the dramatic loss of jobs, but the dismantling of an 
entire parallel welfare state (cf. Auyero 2004; Svampa and Pereyra 2004: 103–151). In both cases, 
massive roadblocks (piquetes) erupting in the mid-1990s forced state representatives to negotiate 
with the unemployed and respond to their demands. Attempts to openly repress the protests only 
further fueled mobilization. Having demonstrated that it was possible to collectively respond to 
rising unemployment and poverty, these experiences in Argentina’s interior quickly spread across 
the country and, in particular, into the de-industrialized suburbs of Buenos Aires. Given the pre-
ferred mode of contention, the piquete, the movement became to be called (and called themselves) 
the piqueteros. In 1997, there were already 170 piquetes across the country, escalating to 252 
(1999), 514 (2000), 1,383 (2001), and 2,336 (2002) roadblocks.7 In 2003, according to competing 
estimations, between 200,000 and 360,000 of roughly 2.3 million unemployed were organized in a 
broad and heterogeneous set of unemployed organizations (Godio 2003; Svampa and Pereyra 
2004: 233).  
According to Svampa and Pereyra (2004: 55), the rise of the piqueteros was enabled by the “con-
vergence of two factors: the adoption of roadblocks as the generalized technique of struggle, on the 
one hand; the rapid institutionalization of a response by the state via the planes sociales, on the 
                                                 
 
5  Field research on Tunisia has been carried out in Tunis, Sfax and Gabes, in November 2014 and March 2015 and 
included semi-structured interviews with individual UDC members, group interviews and participant observation of 
organizational meetings and demonstrations. To explore the social and political relations of the UDC, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with trade unionists and politicians. Expert interviews with scholars, journalists and NGOs 
active in the socioeconomic field helped contextualize and double-check the findings.  
6  The following section draws on Wolff (2007: 6–9). 
7  Data taken from Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoría (cf. Wolff 2007: 6). 
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other”.8 The former offered a strategy of protest that proved effective, could be adopted easily and 
created collective experiences and solidarity. The latter refers to social cash transfers that the feder-
al and provincial governments have granted to unemployed households since the mid-1990s; in 
return, the recipients were generally obliged to participate in municipal work or local development 
projects. Thus, the unemployed protests had a tangible, feasible and unifying object: the granting 
of new and the perpetuation of existing “social plans”. In 1999, the new government headed by 
Fernando de la Rúa allowed the piquetero organizations to manage part of the social subsidies and 
the corresponding local development projects. Reacting to the open socio-political crisis, interim 
president Eduardo Duhalde in 2002 massively extended the social plans, which finally included 
some two million households (CELS 2003). By continuing to block roads, the piquetero organiza-
tions were able to achieve the granting of such social plans (and food aid etc.), including in nearly 
10% of the cases the right to fully manage the corresponding funds and projects.  
The increase of unemployed organizations and roadblocks in 2000 and 2001 went hand in hand 
with efforts to coordinate and organize the different groups. While attempts to unite the piquet-
eros failed, they nevertheless led to the emergence of coordinating bodies, cooperative relations 
and concerted protest activities, if primarily within the different wings of the movement (see be-
low). Thus, they furthered the image of the piqueteros as the new contentious political actor on the 
national scene. In the end, the mass protests of December 2001 that led to the ousting of President 
De la Rúa were largely a spontaneous “social explosion” in reaction to the desperate political at-
tempts to save the Argentine economic model currency board where organized societal forces 
played minor roles only (Wolff 2007: 8). Yet, the escalation of social protest, which was particularly 
driven by the piqueteros, certainly prepared the (contentious) ground for the latter events. With 
the experience of December 2001 and confronted with Duhalde’s weak transition government, in 
2002, the piquetero movement only gained momentum. 
In 2002 and, in particular, following the 2003 election of Néstor Kirchner who initiated a post-
neoliberal turn in economic policies and presided over a remarkable economic recovery, the un-
employed movement split into roughly two wings: a group of reformist, dialogue-oriented organi-
zations that were willing to negotiate, if not openly cooperate with the state, and a group of contes-
tatory organizations that took a much more confrontational, if not revolutionary stance towards 
the state. While in the years since 2003 some individual organizations have changed allegiances 
and the entire movement of unemployed organizations has significantly lost strength, this basic 
distinction persists until today (cf. Kaese and Wolff 2016; Le Borgne de Boisriou 2014; Svampa 
2011). The most important organization representing the former wing is the Federación Tierra y 
Vivienda (FTV), the largest nation-wide piquetero organization that has been allied to the dissi-
dent labor confederation Central de los Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA); it is characterized by a 
trade-unionist and left-Peronist orientation, and has openly supported both the government of 
Kirchner (2003–2007) and that of his wife and then widow Cristina Fernández (2008–2015) (cf. 
Serdar 2015). The latter group – which in December 2001 formed the National Piquetero Block – 
has united organizations led by small parties of the traditional radical left like the Trotzkyist Polo 
Obrero and various, usually small groups of autonomist unemployed organizations that are largely 
based in local communities in the Greater Buenos Aires area (cf. Rossi 2015: 118; Svampa and 
Pereyra 2004: 239–42). 
After peaking at more than 2,000 roadblocks in the year following the “social explosion”, the num-
ber of piquetero protests has since gone down almost continuously (Kaese and Wolff 2016). From 
2003 onwards, dialogue-oriented unemployed organizations such as the FTV openly supported 
President Kirchner, with piquetero leaders even taking up posts in the government. In a context of 
political and economic re-stabilization, the more radical groups saw themselves increasingly mar-
ginalized which led many of them to focus on local community work. This retreat to the local level 
                                                 
 
8  All English translations of quotations are the authors’. 
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was generally supported by the governments of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández which 
have increased social programs to subsidize small “productive enterprises” and cooperatives (in 
part) organized by the unemployed organizations (cf. Le Borgne de Boisriou 2014: 131–132; Svam-
pa 2011; Wolff 2007: 24). When, in 2008, the number of roadblocks again escalated to unprece-
dented heights, it was the agricultural associations that used this technique of contentious action in 
their resistance against an increase in the export duties on agricultural products (Svampa 2014: 
162–163). Recent years, however, saw a significant re-increase in protests by piquetero organiza-
tions, confirming that the unemployed organizations still retain a certain capacity to mobilize and 
act contentiously (cf. Fraga 2014; Kaese and Wolff 2016).  
3. THE UNEMPLOYED MOVEMENT IN TUNISIA 
Unemployment was the major grievance that motivated public protests in Tunisia during the last 
decade in spite of the very limited freedom of public speech, assembly and association under the 
Ben Ali regime. Much of the discontent caused by the lack of employment has been voiced in 
spontaneous, unorganized and locally limited protests.9 Although there have been incidents when 
they connected on a regional (2008, 2015) and a national level (2010/2011), no organization 
emerged as an umbrella for these activities. The only organization of relevance that operates na-
tion-wide is the UDC that has rallied for the cause of unemployed graduates since 2006. In their 
very first sit-in in front of the Ministry of the Interior, former student union activists who had been 
unemployed since their graduation protested against corrupt recruitment procedures in the public 
sector. These initial protests met with a complete lack of recognition from the government, which 
motivated the activists to found the UDC.10 
The UDC started with only a few hundred activists who demanded a reform of the nontransparent 
and corrupted procedures in which public sector jobs were distributed among university gradu-
ates. Operating illegally during the Ben Ali regime, the most important incident of mobilization 
was the UDC’s participation in the popular uprising in the Gafsa mining basin in 2008. What start-
ed as a spontaneous protest against the corrupt distribution of jobs at the phosphate mining com-
pany (Compagnie des phosphates de Gafsa – CGT), the major employer of the region, turned into 
a six month long revolt for work and regional development (Gobe 2010). The unemployed gradu-
ates did not play a prominent role during these protests but helped sustain and organize them 
together with local trade unionists. The uprising also revealed common claims uniting the UDC 
and other marginalized groups. Despite a brutal crackdown by the security forces, the length and 
vehemence of the protests paved the way for the 2010 uprising that also started in Tunisia’s mar-
ginalized hinterland as a massive protest mainly driven by socioeconomic grievances. In 2010, 
however, regional and national leaders of the trade union federation supported the protests, which 
helped them to spread to the more developed urban coastal areas where the uprising turned into a 
broader movement for change that included claims for political rights and freedoms (Chomiak 
2011; Allal 2013). 
After the toppling of Ben Ali, the UDC grew to a membership of today 16,000 (out of a population 
of 10 million). Between 2,000 and 3,000 are considered active members.11 Since 2011, UDC’s activ-
ism has increased in quantity, geographical scope and repertoire of contention. The organization 
also developed a broader agenda of political demands and internal democratic procedures. In 2013, 
an executive board was elected and founding member and long-term UDC leader Salam al-Ayari 
officially became the general secretary of UDC. 
                                                 
 
9  Interview with several activists of the NGO “Forum tunisien pour les droits économiques et sociaux” (FTDES) that 
report on and support socioeconomic protests all over Tunisia. Media reports on public contention in the marginalized 
interior regions of Tunisia confirm the assessment. 
10  Interview with founder and current leader of the UDC, Salam al-Ayari, Tunis, March 2015. 
11  Interview Salam al-Ayari, Tunis, March 2015. 
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What is specific about an unemployed movement that represents university graduates is that most 
activists have never been employed before. UDC members, therefore, claim a right to work they 
never enjoyed. In their understanding, this right is violated if they are forced to work in the infor-
mal sector, have only a temporary contract in the formal sector or a job that does not fit their level 
of academic education.12 The UDC, thus, rebels against the broken promise that higher education 
is a guarantee for social mobility and a life with dignity. While the academic system produced 
more and more university graduates without a real chance for decent employment afterwards, 
hiring practices in the public sector shifted from a principle of educational meritocracy to a clien-
telist logic that privileged familial and regional solidarities (Hafaiedh 2000). Unemployed activism 
of graduates in Tunisia, thereby, also turned against old and new networks of influence and de-
pendency. 
Another major issue for the UDC has been development, especially of the marginalized regions in 
the South and the interior parts of Tunisia. Before the revolution in 2010, 90% of new jobs and 
enterprises were created in the coastal governorates of Tunis, Bizerte, Nabeul, Sousse, Monastir 
and Sfax (Boughzala and Hamdi 2014: 6). Resource extraction (phosphate and oil) as well as agri-
culture have been the main sources of employment in Tunisia’s hinterland, yet even the major 
profits of these sectors are channeled to the centers of economic prosperity until today. Improve-
ments in education in the marginalized regions did not lead to job creation, but instead to higher 
awareness of persisting inequality.  
Both issue areas, socioeconomic regional marginalization and access to the job market, are directly 
reflected in the unemployed graduates’ activism in Tunisia, especially since 2011. In order to sys-
tematically identify the (shifting) claims and the (evolving) repertoire of contention, we analyzed 
the Facebook pages of the national bureau and the regional offices of the UDC. The period covered 
ranges from September 2011, when the union started to use the social media platform for reporting 
about its activities, until June 2015. The most frequently raised claim was the call for employment 
and development, followed by calls for a reform of and a fight against corruption in the recruit-
ment procedures in the public sector, including giving UDC an active role in the process. From 
2014 on, however, further mobilization developed against political repression and lack of recogni-
tion by state actors. The UDC here rallied either against the repression of fellow activists or in 
solidarity with UDC activists whose activities were simply ignored.13  
The level of activism has increased over the years and reached a new record high in 2015 with 80 
events in six months, compared to 39 in the whole year of 2012. This points to an increasing frus-
tration with the newly installed democratic institutions as none of the six governments that fol-
lowed the toppling of Ben Ali offered anything resembling a broader economic agenda promising 
the creation of jobs. In the difficult economic situation after the revolution, individual measures 
(such as financial support to attend trainings) or exemptions from social security taxes in the pri-
vate sector failed to seriously tackle the issue of unemployment. Instead, successive governments 
have tended to occasionally create jobs in the public sector, either to calm protests or to satisfy the 
needs of a specific constituency. With a view to the latter, the UDC – and a broader anti-Islamist 
public – accused the Islamist Nahda Party of having created 24,000 jobs in the public sector only 
for its own clientele.14  
                                                 
 
12  Group interview with UDC activists, Tunis, March 2015. A similar concept of unemployment is found in Morocco, see 
Emperador Badimon (2013a, b). 
13  Three fourths of all protests against repression since September 2011 occurred between 2014 and June 2015, and 22 out 
of 33 solidarity events took place during the first six months of 2015. 
14  Interview Salam al-Ayari, Tunis, March 2015. 
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4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
4.1 Grievances: increasing unemployment as a trigger 
Studies on European countries suggest that a relative increase in unemployment, rather than its 
absolute level, “constitutes fertile ground for the organization of and protests by the unemployed” 
(Chabanet and Faniel 2012: 12). In terms of the overall scholarship on contentious action, this 
points to the relevance of relative deprivation (Gurr 1970) or grievances (Simmons 2014) as a first 
factor that refers to the motivation, or reasons, that leads people to initiate or join unemployed 
movements (cf. Baglioni et al. 2008: 325–327; Lahusen 2013: 6). This is supported by the two cases 
examined here. 
In Argentina, the correlation between increasing social hardships and the growth of the unem-
ployment movement is obvious. Urban unemployment rates increased from 7% in 1992 to 14% in 
1999 to reach almost 20% in 2002; during the same time period poverty rates (in Greater Buenos 
Aires) rose from almost 19% to nearly 27% to more than 52% (Epstein and Pion-Berlin 2006: 8). At 
the same time, as the governments at the central and provincial levels were increasingly running 
out of cash, a series of social assistance programs were cut back (Epstein 2006: 99). The neoliberal 
reforms, the crisis and, ultimately, the virtual collapse of the Argentine economy thereby greatly 
enhanced the social basis of the piqueteros. Poverty and unemployment became problems that 
affected large parts of the population, including urban sectors and (former) middle classes (cf. 
Epstein 2006: 98–100; Wolff 2009: 1007–1008).  
In Tunisia, too, rising unemployment rates correlate with the mobilization of the unemployed. 
More specifically, it was a specific worsening of the situation among university graduates that has 
driven mobilization. Tunisia, as other resource-poor countries in North Africa, followed a state 
developmental model in the 1960s that included jobs for university graduates as part of an “author-
itarian bargain” (Desai et al. 2009): in exchange for political loyalty, the state provided jobs and 
social protection. The authoritarian regime furthermore presented education as a guarantee for 
social mobility (cf. Hafaiedh 2000). When Tunisia embarked on neoliberal reforms in the late 
1980s, however, privatization and liberalization meant that fewer jobs in the public sector were 
available. At the same, the number of university graduates increased drastically, from 121,000 in 
1997 to 336,000 in 2007 (Timoumi 2013:118), while the quality of public education suffered from 
budget cuts.  
The initial mobilization of Tunisia’s unemployed graduates coincides with this worsening of their 
situation. Unemployment rates among university graduates rose from 3.8% (1994) to 14.0% 
(2005), 16.9 % (2006), 18.2 % (2007) and 20.0% (2008), 21.9 (2009), 22.9 (2010) to 29.2 (2011) 
(Touhami 2012). Throughout the first decade of the 2000s, the official total unemployment rate 
remained at 13–14%. After the ouster of Ben Ali, unemployment rose to 19 % in 2011, but has 
remained at 15% since 2012.15 However, the share of unemployed graduates is still high at around 
30%,16 which helps explain increased mobilization after 2011.  
4.2 Organizational resources and mobilizing structures: enabling conditions 
Social movement research has amply documented that grievances alone are far from sufficient to 
enable collective contentious action (cf. McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 2011). In order for a social 
movement to arise and spread, social networks need to develop and organizations need to be 
formed. This is particularly true for unemployed movements who usually have scarce resources 
and “mobilizing structures” (McAdam et al. 2001: 47–48) at their disposal (cf. Bagguley 1992: 447–
450; Baglioni et al. 2008: 329–330). Therefore, existing research on European cases has emphasized 
                                                 
 
15  Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), accessed via http://bit.ly/1NFVJXU. 
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the support and solidarity of other social and political organizations, most notably of trade unions, 
but also of (leftist) political parties (cf. Baglioni et al. 2008: 330–332; Chabanet and Faniel 2012: 
16–19; Della Porta 2008: 291; Lahusen 2013: 11–12; Linders and Kalander 2007). Likewise, our two 
cases show the importance of material and immaterial resources as well as of mobilizing structures 
which are somehow seized and/or appropriated from existing sources and sites. 
In Argentina, three such sources have been crucial: pre-existing local mobilizing structures; allied 
sociopolitical organizations; and state subsidies. First, research on the piqueteros shows that a 
specific territoriality, that is, “a foundation and embeddedness in the local sphere or community” 
(Wolff 2007: 10), has been a crucial feature of mobilization processes. The Argentine unemployed 
organizations emerged in poor and marginalized (sub-)urban spaces and, in doing so, could draw 
on existing local solidarity networks built on experiences with collective land occupations, infor-
mal housing projects, the self-organization of basic social services, and communal nurseries, soup 
kitchens and health centers (Merklen 2004; cf. Svampa and Pereyra 2004: 55–72). As a result, al-
most all unemployed organizations – even those that were formed by political parties and/or later 
became part of nation-wide organizations – have been based on grassroots organizations that con-
duct self-help initiatives, operate embedded in the respective local communities and focus on serv-
ing tangible local needs (Wolff 2007: 15). 
Second, besides such very local organizational resources and structures, the piqueteros have also 
benefited from alliances with sociopolitical organizations such as parties and trade unions. It is not 
by chance that the largest unemployed organizations are those that have a direct trade-union nex-
us, namely the above-mentioned FTV as well as the Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC). Both 
emerged from deindustrialized popular districts (in Greater Buenos Aires) and, thus, their leader-
ship and base draws to an important extent on former industrial workers and trade union activists. 
The direct relationship with national trade-union organizations has been particularly important in 
helping unite local initiatives in an institutionalized, nation-wide organizational structure with the 
capacity to represent the organization in the public and political sphere (cf. Svampa and Pereyra 
2004: 58–63). As mentioned above, other piquetero organizations have rather benefited from close 
connections with (usually small, but well-organized) political parties, while it is not by chance that 
the autonomist unemployed organizations have mostly remained fairly small, only loosely coordi-
nated local initiatives. 
Third, it was state subsidies, and the mentioned social cash transfer programs in particular, that 
offered important material resources enabling the unemployed organizations to expand their 
communal work. The administration of these programs both facilitated and pushed the improve-
ment of the unemployed organizations’ internal structures and strengthened their ties to the indi-
vidual member and to the respective local community (cf. Delamata 2004: 9–11; Svampa and 
Pereyra 2004: 88–102). Yet, these state subsidies were gained by the very mobilization of the un-
employed; this, in many cases, included fierce local struggles between piqueteros and local state 
authorities or representatives of the traditional political parties (cf. Delamata 2004: 9–11; Mazzeo 
2004: 75–110). In this sense, the granting of social subsidies constituted an important motivation 
driving contentious action, which also allowed the organizations to offer selective incentives to 
their activists.17 This role of state subsidies as supporting mobilization, however, changed later 
when they increasingly became a means of tying unemployed organizations to the government and 
thereby effectively taming them (see below). 
In Tunisia, too, pre-existing mobilizing structures and alliances with societal actors were important 
factors for the development of the unemployed movement. In contrast to Argentina, however, 
state subsidies were never deployed as a strategy to calm unemployed protests, neither under dicta-
                                                 
 
17  Emperador Badimon (2013b: 201–202) reports a similar logic in the case of the Morocco: Unemployed groups estab-
lished lists with their members ranked according to their level of activity in the movement which then served as a basis 
for the distribution of the jobs in the public administration they had “won”. 
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torship when the organization was formally illegal, nor during the six governments since 2011. 
Resources of the UDC, therefore, remained severely limited, and the UDC could never act as an 
autonomous provider of social services for its members, which in turn restricted its expansion. It 
however managed to sustain activism because of resources derived from existing networks of the 
students’ union, its alliance with the trade union federation and its outreach via local offices to 
marginalized regions far off the strongholds of the Ben Ali regime. 
In terms of pre-existing mobilizing structures, the students’ union (Union générale des étudiants 
de Tunisie – UGET) provided the space in which the very idea to found a graduate unemployed 
organization was born. Correspondingly, the first UDC activists had all been active UGET mem-
bers. In addition to their level of education, this helps explain the high organizational skills from 
the beginning.18 Not only did UGET provide a pool of already mobilized people willing to join the 
UDC after their graduation, but it also contributed a network of people, who had built mutual trust 
during years of joint activism. The UDC could also build on prior experiences with claim-making 
and on a common frame to interpret the political, social and economic situation of Tunisia.19  
Equally important for the provision of resources was, second, the alliance with the trade union 
federation Union générale tunisienne du travail (UGTT). Drawing on its legacy from the fight of 
independence from the French and because of its high, nationwide organizational capacities, the 
UGTT retained an important role as a collective actor even during the dictatorship. Although its 
leadership was coopted by the Ben Ali regime, local cadres remained autonomous from political 
interference, creating the perception that UGTT was the only organization in which dissent could 
be voiced (Yousfi 2015a). The trade union federation served as an umbrella for different kinds of 
socioeconomic and political claims and provided support and shelter for the UGET as well as the 
UDC (Yousfi 2015b). In addition, the alliance of UGTT, UGET and UDC served as a natural ca-
reer of activism over different stages of life in which the UDC represented the bridge from student 
activism to labor activism.20 The cooperation of these societal actors with left-wing parties, most 
importantly Tunisia’s Communist Workers’ Party, contributed to broaden demands and organiza-
tional skills (Chomiak 2014: 31–2; Antonakis-Nashif 2015: 12). Their support, however, remained 
limited as the parties themselves were heavily repressed.  
After the revolution, the UGTT expanded its political role, as a broker of the National Dialogue, 
but also as the official representative of social demands within the Social Dialogue. On the one 
hand, the tripartite negotiations between the UGTT, the employers’ association (Union tunisienne 
de l'industrie, du commerce et de l'artisanat – UTICA) and the government over social protection 
and employment increased the power of the trade union federation. On the other hand, this in-
creasing strength of the UGTT limited the influence of other social organizations and made the 
latter dependent on the trade unions. This ambivalence of the alliance with trade unions became 
visible after the revolution (see below). 
A third factor that helped develop UDC activism from the very beginning was its regional out-
reach. Upon its foundation, only a few hundred activists established three offices in the cities of 
Jendouba, Gabes and Redeyef, all of which have suffered from economic marginalization. Building 
local networks laid the foundation for broader protest activities such as the aforementioned 2008 
revolt in the region of Gafsa that constituted the first event in which the cause of the UDC, the 
right to work, led to a broader alliance in which the UDC expanded contacts and networks. Local 
alliances in the marginalized regions were also the core of the 2010 upheaval that swept from the 
interior regions to the capital of Tunisia, yet this time they transcended the regional boundaries 
                                                 
 
18  Research on unemployment movements in Europe suggests a positive correlation between education levels and politi-
cal activism (Lahusen 2013: 9). 
19  In general, therefore, the UDC has shared a radical leftist agenda of the UGET and local cadres of UGTT including a 
pronounced criticism of neoliberal policies especially of privatization and the role of international financial institu-
tions. 
20  Group interview with UDC activists, Tunis, March 2015. 
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with the support of the national leadership of the trade union federation (cf. Chomiak 2011; Allal 
2013). 
After the revolution, the UDC did not have to work clandestinely anymore. On the one hand, new 
resources for mobilization, most importantly the cheap communication technology of new social 
media, became accessible and are now very professionally used. Instead of investing time and 
money in own web pages or printed publications, the UDC mostly uses Facebook to inform about 
its activities. The national as well as the local and regional offices publish declarations and open 
letters, post videos and share links among each other. On the other hand, financially, the UDC 
works with very limited resources and based on volunteer work. Media and general public atten-
tion is relatively low which explains that an increasing share of the activities is driven by solidarity 
with protests that receive little public attention. This puts even more pressure on an organization 
with very limited resources. A recent sharp increase in hunger strikes underlines that unemployed 
graduates do not see a lot of other means to create pressure on the government than their bare 
lives.21 As a political ally, the newly formed left-wing party alliance “Popular Front” (jabha 
sha`biyya) led by the former party leader of the Workers’ Party, Hamma Hammami, generally 
supports the cause of the UDC and expresses solidarity with its activities. Yet, it remains weak with 
only 15 out of 217 parliamentary seats. The limited cooperation also becomes visible in the fact 
that the UDC did not officially support the Popular Front in the parliamentary and presidential 
elections in 2014 (UDC 2014). 
4.3 Framing: collective action frames and public resonance 
In the case of unemployed people, the very motivation to act collectively is also problematic given 
that people, under these conditions, tend to focus “their energy and attention on survival,” while 
“downward mobility” often leads to “sheer demoralization” (Waisman 1999: 47). This is further 
reinforced by the lack of a common identity among the unemployed and by the “stigmatization” 
they frequently experience in the society at large (Chabanet and Faniel 2012: 1). As a result, it is 
crucial to include the ideational dimension of mobilization and, more specifically, the “collective 
action frames” (Benford and Snow 2000) that inform unemployed movements as well as the cul-
tural framework that creates a certain resonance for their claims in the larger society (cf. Giugni 
2008: 302; Della Porta 2008: 282; Chabanet and Faniel 2012: 19–20; Lahusen 2013: 8). In order for 
mobilization to succeed, thus, both the unemployed themselves and the general public have to view 
unemployment as a social problem that has to be addressed at the political level rather than as an 
individual failure of those affected. 
In Argentina, it was the escalating economic and political crisis that made the general public more 
and more receptive to the claims articulated by the piqueteros. The dramatic worsening of the 
situation in 2001 and 2002 meant that social hardships were seen as produced by a specific eco-
nomic model and a particular set of decisions of the political elite (cf. Epstein 2006: 107). The dis-
ruptive tactics applied by the unemployed organizations thus came to be seen as an appropriate 
response to an unresponsive and irresponsible political regime. The slogan “Que se vayan todos” 
(“Out with them all!”) that dominated the protests of December 2001 meant that the piqueteros’ 
criticism as to the exclusionary nature of both the political regime and the economic model was 
broadly appreciated (cf. Svampa 2014: 156–159). During this context of open crisis, the protests of 
the unemployed and poor people from the marginalized suburban areas (the piqueteros) met with 
direct support from the urban middle sectors that protested by banging pots (cacerolazos) and 
organized neighborhood assemblies. The relevance of this public resonance became obvious once 
it started to decline: With the Kirchner government taking up many claims raised during the pro-
tests and with the economic situation improving, societal calls for a “normalization” of the situa-
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tion spread and the appropriateness of continued roadblocks met with increasing criticism. As a 
consequence, those piquetero groups that continued confronting the government were more and 
more marginalized politically (cf. Wolff 2007: 23–24). 
With a view to the internal construction of a viable collective action frame, the very practice of 
collective protest proved crucial (cf. Auyero 2004). Together, the collective experience of massive 
(and successful) roadblocks and the participatory solidarity work in the respective local settings 
helped transform the negatively defined self-identification as “the unemployed” into a positive 
identity: the piquetero. Being a piquetero meant being part of a collective (rather than an individu-
al unemployed) and being active (rather than a passive victim). At the same time, however, the 
identity as a piquetero – defined as an unemployed worker – still meant identifying with a situa-
tion (being unemployed) that was supposed to be temporary (cf. Svampa and Pereyra 2004: 168–
174). This became a problem once the economic situation improved and unemployment started to 
go down. In general, the failed attempts to unite the unemployed movement as well as its increas-
ing fragmentation since 2003 shows that main elements of the collective action frame driving the 
unemployed protests were still “negative”: directed against a specific (neoliberal) kind of economic 
policies, against a political regime that does not respond to societal claims, against mass poverty 
and rising unemployment etc. The social category of “unemployed workers”, or so it seems, does 
not represent a viable social cleavage on which to build a unified political organization with a “pos-
itive” agenda for change (Wolff 2007: 27). Under these circumstances, the logic of struggling for 
tangible benefits (social cash transfers, state support for local “productive projects” or coopera-
tives) became another crucial element that framed and made sense of the collective action of the 
piqueteros (cf. Svampa and Pereyra 2004: 172; Wolff 2007: 7). But this orientation at obtaining a 
maximum amount of state resources had also ambivalent effects: On the one hand, it has meant 
that the different unemployed organizations were and are effectively competing with each other; 
on the other, it created a dependency on the state, facilitating governmental strategies aimed at 
coopting and dividing the piqueteros. 
Similar to the South American case, the aggravation of living conditions of wide parts of the Tuni-
sian society helped the unemployed graduates to present themselves as sharing grievances with 
other social groups. In contrast to Argentina, however, the grievance was not framed as an exclu-
sion from the labor market, but as an enforced situation of waiting for inclusion. This phenome-
non is part of a bigger social problem, often labeled as “waithood” (Singerman 2007; Dhillon and 
Youssef 2009), that was crucial for both the construction of a common identity and collective ac-
tion frame among the unemployed and for enabling a broader public resonance for their claims. It 
denominates delayed adulthood due to the lack of resources, most importantly work. Without 
regular income, other aspects of adulthood such as founding a family by getting married and mov-
ing out of the parents’ home are all put on hold. Waiting became the main attitude of university 
graduates, supported by a state that created a system to hide the status of waithood through intern-
ships or annual recruitment exams (the ones that did not pass were only waiting for the next 
round) (cf. Hafaiedh 2000). In the context of the aforementioned authoritarian bargain, waithood, 
thereby, also reflected a submission to the state as a welfare provider.  
Young people stuck in the phase of adolescence were long associated with passivity. Agency was 
only found in individual coping strategies. Honwana (2014) finds collective action against 
waithood with a transformative potential, yet “only” as spontaneous protests without sustained 
and organized mobilization. It is against this backdrop that one has to understand the collective 
action frame of the unemployed activists of the UDC: overcoming waithood by, first, calling their 
situation by the name. Instead of finding excuses for informal economic activities, they define 
themselves as unemployed. The same holds true for temporarily limited contracts and jobs per-
ceived as inadequate for university graduates. Unemployment, thus, has become an element of 
identity in a political struggle that aims at reclaiming the right to work in order to leave 
“waithood”. Demanding employment in the civil service and public sector still reflects the notion 
of the state as the welfare provider that had been a key element of the old authoritarian bargain. 
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Yet, the former role of the state within the authoritarian regime has now turned into a responsibil-
ity of the state that the activists are free to call for in a democratizing regime, also by contentious 
actions.  
This holds true not only for unemployed with a university degree. The broader social meaning of 
work becomes evident when we see how the major slogan of the UDC travelled: “shughl, hurriya, 
karama wataniya” (work, freedom and national dignity). It was invented by UDC activists in their 
founding protest event in their very first sit-in in 2006. Yet, the slogan was adaptable and was 
widely chanted in the uprising of 2008 in the Gafsa region. Unemployed without university degree 
also picked it up when they protested against logics of clientelism and patronage in the job distri-
bution of the phosphate mining company. The peak of social acceptance was reached in the upris-
ing of 2010/2011 when “work, freedom, and national dignity” became a central slogan heard from 
the beginning of the revolution in the interior of Tunisia until the last days ending with the ouster 
of Ben Ali. The combined claim for political and economic rights, as expressed in the call for digni-
ty, served as the perfect umbrella for the more socially and economically motivated protests from 
the Tunisian hinterland and protesters from coastal regions focusing on political rights.  
After the revolution, however, the political discourse and mainstream media sidelined socioeco-
nomic claims. They focused on the transition to a democratic regime, i.e. on the election and work 
of the National Constituent Assembly (2011–2014), as well as on the increasing polarization be-
tween the Islamist Party al-Nahda and Nidaa Tunis, a broad alliance of anti-Islamist forces includ-
ing a high number of former members from the ruling party under Ben Ali. The polarization and 
securitization increased with the politically motivated assassinations against left wing politicians in 
2013 and the terrorist attacks against tourists in March and June 2015. Social movements especially 
in the marginalized regions are denounced as contributing to disorder and chaos and paving the 
way for terrorism.22 This mainstream discourse contributed to a general fatigue with protests and 
strikes that continue nevertheless. At the same time, UDC activists have increasingly framed their 
demands within a broader cluster of claims concerning development, thereby reaching out to the 
main claim raised in the contestation in the South and hinterland, i.e. the development of the mar-
ginalized regions.  
4.4 Shifting political opportunities: ambivalent effects 
The role of (shifting) political opportunity structures, which is very prominent in the overall study 
of social movements (cf. McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 2011), does not loom large in the research 
on European unemployed movements. Focusing on Europe, Giugni (2008: 306) has explicitly sug-
gested that the mobilization of the unemployed “is influenced only to a limited extent by the gen-
eral political opportunity structures, while it is much more sensitive to the specific political oppor-
tunity structures”, the latter referring, for instance, to the specific shape of the welfare state (see 
also Lahusen 2013: 5, 17).23 Although the relevant policy fields in Argentina and Tunisia are very 
different from each other as well as from the European countries analyzed by Giugni (2008), the 
specific opportunity structures clearly influenced unemployed activism also in the Southern cases. 
In Argentina, as described above, the specific logic of direct social subsidies granted to the unem-
ployed (organizations) shaped the dynamics of mobilization (again, in ambivalent ways). In the 
case of the unemployed graduates in Tunisia, the relevant policy field addressed by the movement 
was not social security as such but rather the public sector (and its recruitment procedures) 
through which social benefits were distributed. Neither regime change nor increasing contention 
among the unemployed graduates has changed the ways in which the state distributes social securi-
                                                 
 
22  The latest example was President Beji Qaid Essebsi’s immediate reaction to the Sousse terrorist attack (Marzouki 2015). 
23  Chabanet and Faniel (2012: 16), for instance, briefly refer to “the importance of political opportunity structures”, but 
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ty and therefore, as mentioned above, continue to shape unemployed grievances and UDC de-
mands in spite of the far-reaching political changes since 2011.  
In contrast to the European cases however, (changes in) the general political opportunity struc-
tures clearly shaped the emergence and dynamics of unemployed movements in both Argentina 
and Tunisia. Indeed, the development of these unemployed movements is interconnected with all 
four dimensions of political opportunity structures as defined by McAdam (1996: 27): the open-
ness/closure of the political system, the (in-)stability of elite alignments, the presence/absence of 
elite allies, and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. However, as we will show, in-
creasing political opportunities have had ambivalent effects on the two movements.  
In Argentina, a generally established, but publicly de-legitimized democratic regime presented a 
decisive opportunity structure for the unemployed movement. In this context, which prohibited an 
all-out strategy of repression, individual attempts at repressing protests only fueled mobilization 
processes and increased the solidarity with and among the piqueteros (cf. Dinerstein 2003: 4–5; 
Epstein 2006: 101–102; Wolff 2009: 1012). After the “social explosion” of December 2001, the weak 
transition government and the persistently high level of societal protests meant increasing oppor-
tunities to enforce political concessions. Hence, interim president Duhalde had to accept the un-
employed organizations as official interlocutors and respond to their protests by expanding social 
emergency plans. As concerns the issue of repression, when in June 2002 the police killed two 
piqueteros, President Duhalde felt obliged to bring forward the presidential elections in order to 
prevent social protest from escalating into uncontrollable degrees (Wolff 2007: 8). 
The election and assumption of Néstor Kirchner, then, implied a profound “change in political 
opportunity structures” (Svampa and Pereyra 2004: 212) – with, however, ambivalent effects. On 
the one hand, the center-left, post-neoliberal, inclusionary, and popular discourse of the new gov-
ernment implied a general openness towards both the claims and the representatives of the piquet-
eros. This greatly increased the political opportunities for those unemployed organizations that 
were willing to adopt a cooperative stance towards the government: they could gain a voice, if not a 
post, in the government and increase the amount of state support for their own (local) activities 
(cf. Rossi 2015). On the other hand, however, this opening of political opportunities further aggra-
vated the fragmentation of the unemployed movement as such. As Svampa and Pereyra (2004: 
212) have noted, “Kirchner’s policy consisted in applying, simultaneously, a whole range of strate-
gies available to integrate, coopt, discipline and/or isolate the universe of the piquetero movement, 
discriminating between the different wings and organizations.” With a view to the more contesta-
tory unemployed organizations, this included a targeted strategy of delegitimation and criminali-
zation. But also in the case of the cooperative piqueteros, the possibilities of exerting an influence 
on the government largely remained informal, depending on personal relations and clientelist 
mechanisms, while the direct relation with the government reduced their capacity and willingness 
to act autonomously and contentiously (Wolff 2007: 26–27).24 
The Tunisian case, first and foremost, demonstrates that political opportunity structures do not 
determine processes of mobilization, but that the latter can, themselves, contribute to opening up 
what was initially a closed political environment. When the UDC emerged, Ben Ali’s regime was 
extremely hostile to any form of social activism, even compared to many other authoritarian re-
gimes in North Africa. Public protests were extremely rare and mostly ended with violent repres-
sion. Independent organizations and associations had to work clandestinely. Media was state con-
trolled and party pluralism severely limited. As described before, only the trade union federation 
enjoyed a little room of maneuver – and by sharing this room with the unemployed activists, the 
                                                 
 
24  In Morocco, in a quite different political context, a fairly similar logic can be observed: Here, the focus on “material”, 
rather than “political”, demands was used by the political regime in order to dissociate the movement of unemployed 
postgraduates from the 2011 pro-democracy protests (Emperador Badimon 2013: 207–208). 
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latter became able to start a movement that contributed to the wave of protests that, in the end, 
toppled the political regime.  
With the fall of the Ben Ali regime in January 2011, the political environment changed dramatical-
ly from extremely close to fairly open. People made much use of the newly won freedom of speech 
and association and, as a consequence, all variants of public protest and civil society activism at 
first increased tremendously. Since then, different waves of protests have occurred.25 Also, the 
UDC profited from the new openness and expanded in numbers of members and geographical 
outreach. Mobilization increased significantly.  
At the same time as the UDC took advantage of the new opportunities, it gained also autonomy 
from its former allies, UGET and UGTT. The dependency on the UGTT decreased and a more 
critical view towards the trade union federation developed. UDC activists increasingly felt being 
exploited by the trade union: When needed, they were used for building up pressure; yet, as soon 
as the UGTT sat down at the negotiation table with political actors, workers’ interests such as the 
increase of salaries were all that mattered and the unemployed needs were ignored.26 The UGTT, 
on its part, has adopted an ambivalent view on unemployed protests because of what they regard as 
negative side effects on workers: for instance, when protests harm the phosphate mining activities 
or block the means of transportation in the Gafsa basin, the processing of phosphate in Gabes and 
Sfax is negatively affected, potentially harming workers as well.27 At the same time, UDC is still in 
dire need of the UGTT (Yousfi 2015b). The trade union federation is the sole powerful societal 
actor from the same political camp capable of strongly bargaining for socioeconomic demands. 
Moreover, it still provides indispensable space for UDC activism, e.g. when offering rooms in trade 
union buildings for hunger strikes. The UGTT also publicly expresses solidarity with UDC protests 
that are ignored by the mainstream media.28  
Also, relations with its other close ally, the student union UGET, have suffered since the opening of 
opportunity structures for activism. The unemployed activists felt as if UGET was not in need of 
cooperation partners anymore.29 This supports the general observation heard in Tunisia that the 
removal of the common enemy, the Ben Ali-regime, led to decreasing cohesion of former anti-
regime alliances. Since 2011, mobilization against the Nahda-led government, especially during the 
summer 2013 after the assassinations of left-wing politicians, constituted such a point to again rally 
together. As soon as the general crisis was over, the alliance weakened and diverging interests seem 
to drive the left-wing allies away from each other.  
The gap between workers and unemployed is a recurrent pattern in labor-unemployed relations 
and often leads to the marginalization of the unemployed movement. This, however, is too early to 
say for the case of Tunisia with a still relatively high level of socioeconomic contention and internal 
struggles among the trade unions themselves about the right balance between UGTT’s political and 
social role (cf. Yousfi 2015a).  
5. CONCLUSION 
The case studies on Argentina and Tunisia confirm key insights from existing research on Europe-
an unemployed movements: it is not so much the absolute level but a relative increase in unem-
                                                 
 
25  The year 2013 for instance was marked by political mobilization in favor and against the Nahda-led government, yet 
exact numbers of participants are disputed (cf. Middle East Monitor 2013). Socioeconomic protests including strikes 
and unemployed activism started to rise again by late 2014 with up to 119 protest events (09/2014) and reached a new 
peak in spring 2015 with 474 events in April 2015 according to the monthly reports of the FTDES. 
26  Interview Salam al-Ayari, Tunis, March 2015. 
27  Furthermore, UGTT representatives criticize that unemployed protests often lead to concessions that give jobs to 
people that are justified neither by economic needs nor by personal capabilities. Interview with a member of the UGTT 
executive board, Tunis, November 2014.  
28  Group interview with UDC activists, Tunis, March 2015.  
29  Group interview with UDC activists, Tunis, March 2015. 
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ployment that triggers mobilization. In both countries, rising unemployment rates were also ac-
companied by deteriorating living conditions of large parts of society. This explains why the two 
unemployed movements succeeded in framing unemployment as a social, economic and political 
problem and not as the result of individual failure. Yet, on closer look, the specific collective action 
frames of the two unemployed movements have been quite different, mirroring their respective 
constituencies as well as the different sociopolitical contexts: In Argentina, the identity as unem-
ployed workers and the strategy to claim state subsidies have proven crucial, while in the Tunisian 
case the claim for a right to decent work to overcome “waithood” predominated. At the same time, 
both unemployed movements very clearly depended on broader social support for their claims and 
contestatory practices. Such a supportive public resonance was likewise facilitated by the overall 
context of socioeconomic deterioration (and by the legitimacy crisis of the respective political 
regimes). 
As regards the role of organizational resources and mobilizing structures, our findings are also 
generally in line with existing research on European countries. First, both Argentina and Tunisia 
confirm the importance of allies (trade unions, leftist parties) that support the unemployed move-
ments. This was particularly relevant for the Tunisian UDC and the relation with UGTT. Second, 
as in the case of Europe (cf. Baglioni et al. 2008: 327–328; Chabanet and Faniel 2012: 16; Della 
Porta 2008: 282; Lahusen 2013: 14–15; Linders and Kalander 2007), these allies, and trade unions 
in particular, have played an ambivalent role. In the case of Argentina, alliances with competing 
political parties and trade union organizations have significantly reinforced the fragmentation of 
the unemployed movement. In Tunisia, the UDC felt deceived by the trade union confederation 
UGTT, as the latter took on an increasingly political role after the revolution. Third, our case stud-
ies have emphasized how the unemployed movements emerged out of pre-existing social networks 
and benefited from their embeddedness in local communities. This is similar to European experi-
ences, where it is “basically at the local level that the unemployed are part of social networks that 
can be used as vehicles for mobilization” (Chabanet and Faniel 2012: 14; cf. Lahusen 2013: 8). 
While apparently a universal feature of unemployed mobilization, the role of pre-existing local 
networks is arguably of particularly importance in the countries of the Global South, which are 
generally characterized by a higher degree of social and regional heterogeneity as well as by a great-
er social relevance of informal and community structures. In Argentina and Tunisia, such mobiliz-
ing structures and the local rootedness of activism very much helped to overcome the unem-
ployed’s lack of material resources, which is much more pronounced than in the European cases. 
The most specific feature that has shaped the two unemployed movements we have studied, and 
which sets them apart from European experiences, is their interaction with broader uprisings that 
have led to far-reaching political change in Argentina and, in particular, in Tunisia. This, first and 
foremost, shows how contentious actors actively shape the political context in which they operate 
and can, thereby, themselves contribute to expanding their own political opportunities (cf. Tarrow 
2011: 167). Second, the effects of these changing political opportunity structures have been much 
more complex than expectations of linear notions of more or less open/closed political contexts 
that support/constrain movements would suggest. In the Tunisian case, regime change – from 
authoritarianism to a transition towards democracy – clearly benefited the unemployed activism as 
the threat of brutal repression was suspended. New freedoms and liberties were first perceived as 
creating remarkable opportunities for making claims and entering negotiations with state repre-
sentatives that could now be held accountable. The post-revolutionary governments, however, only 
granted a very limited amount of policy concessions and rarely recognized the UDC as a negotia-
tion partner. In line with existing research, which emphasizes that “incoherent” political regimes 
that are neither outright closed and repressive nor consistently open and democratic are particular 
prone to see contentious mobilization (cf. Tarrow 2011: chapter 8; Wolff 2009: 1020, note 11), the 
combination of limited concessions and limited repression has fueled mobilization in Tunisia. In 
general, this finding also holds for the Argentine case, but here policy concessions have been much 
more significant and had decidedly mixed effects on unemployed mobilization: During a first 
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phase of mobilization, the successful struggle for state subsidies fueled the growth of the Argentine 
unemployed movement without implying a turn to a non-contentious service orientation as, e.g., 
in the case of Ireland (Chabanet and Faniel 2012: 10); yet, in later years, these same social pro-
grams increasingly became a mechanism through which the (Kirchner) government coopted indi-
vidual unemployed organizations and deepened the divisions within the unemployed movement. 
In a more general sense, it was the widespread perception that the Kirchner government was really 
taking up many of the claims made by the unemployed organizations (and other protest groups) 
that contributed to the gradual demobilization of unemployed movement as well as to a public 
opinion that became increasingly hostile to the piquetero’s remaining protests. 
In sum, the opening up of the political opportunity structures in both Argentina and Tunisia had 
ambivalent effects. The analysis of unemployed movements that have operated during processes of 
far-reaching political change, thus, reveals important insights into the complex relationship be-
tween contentious action and political change that cannot be gained from studying established 
democracies in the Global North with high (welfare) state capacity only. This also applies to the 
reverse effect: the movements’ impact on the political context. In contrast to the European experi-
ences, which have remained fairly weak across the board, the unemployed movements in Argenti-
na and Tunisia have made significant contributions to the waves of protest that enforced major 
political changes in the two countries. These findings point to the need to further broaden the 
comparative analysis of Southern cases and to better connect social movement theories with re-
search on political regimes and transformation processes. 
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